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Employment Discrimination
by John E. Duvall*
Several interesting and noteworthy employment discrimination cases
were on the docket of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit during the survey period, and one Supreme Court of the United
States employment decision was announced during the period as well. 1
The vast majority of the Eleventh Circuit's employment discrimination
cases continue to be decided in unpublished opinions, most of which were
per curiam opinions affirming grants of summary judgments to
defendant employers. This year's Article is focused on reported decisions,
commenting only on two unpublished decisions. In addition to the cases
discussed in this Article, by the Author's rough count, another
ninety-three employment-related appeals were decided by the Eleventh
Circuit during the survey period. The vast majority of these unreported
decisions involved various issues arising under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 2 while thirteen were Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)3 suits. A like number were brought
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 4 Only
seven of the unreported cases raised issues under section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871,6 and again, a like number raised issues
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871.6

*Of Counsel in the firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1985). Member,
State Bar of Florida.
1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the
prior survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 68 MERCER L. REV. 981 (2017).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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I. TITLE VII OF THE CIviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Stamper v. Duval County School Board,7 the appellate panel was
presented with a rather unique set of facts that developed during the
charge investigation phase of the dispute between a public employer and
one of its former employees. Because of those facts, Stamper, a pro se
plaintiff, was thrown out of court when it was ultimately determined that
her suit had been untimely filed. The unique facts presented the panel
and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
with both regulatory and equitable issues. Writing for the panel, Circuit
Judge William Pryor framed the issues on appeal:
This appeal requires us to decide whether the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission revived an employee's claim of
discrimination-otherwise barred by the statute of limitations-when
it vacated a two-year-old dismissal of the employee's administrative
charge and the Department of Justice issued the employee a new
notice of the right to sue her employer. If the Commission cannot, we
must also decide whether the employee's mental health condition
8
equitably tolled the limitations period for her claim of discrimination.
Concluding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission) lacked authority to issue the second notice the
way it did, and then that the employee had failed to establish her
entitlement to equitable tolling, the panel affirmed the dismissal of
Stamper's civil action by the district court.9
Stamper timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
against her former employer, the Duval County School Board. Following
its investigation, the Commission determined it could not conclude that
a violation of the statutes prohibiting discrimination had occurred, and
therefore, issued Stamper notice of her suit rights. Stamper, however,
failed to sue within ninety days as required by law. Normally, that would
have been the end of her claim. Over two years later, however, Stamper
requested that the EEOC reconsider its earlier decision. For reasons
unclear from the record on appeal, the EEOC obliged, revoking and
vacating its earlier determination. Stamper thereupon filed a second
discrimination charge against her former employer with the Commission
based on the same allegations she asserted in her first charge, requesting
that the Commission issue her a second notice of suit rights. The EEOC
7. 863 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017).
8. Id. at 1338.
9. Id. at 1342.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

2018]

1119

obliged again, and this time Stamper timely sued the school board,
alleging race and disability discrimination. 10
The school board moved to dismiss the suit because it was untimely as
Stamper failed to sue within ninety days of her receipt of the first notice
of suit rights. The district court agreed with the school board that the
complaint was untimely but permitted the parties to engage in limited
discovery on the equitable tolling issue. Stamper alleged, in response to
the school board's motion to dismiss, that her former employer's acts of
discrimination caused her to develop catatonic schizophrenia, which
caused her to miss the first filing deadline. After the limited discovery
had been completed, the district court found that Stamper could have
sued within ninety days of her receipt of the first suit rights letter
notwithstanding her claimed catatonia. Stamper then appealed both of
those rulings."
The appellate panel concluded that the district court correctly decided
both issues and affirmed its rulings. 12 The panel determined first that
the EEOC incorrectly read its own regulation concerning the time
available for it to reconsider a no-cause determination and the mechanics
of the revocation process specifically articulated in the regulation:
The regulation makes clear that the Commission lacked the authority
to revive Stamper's claim of discrimination; that is, neither the
Commission nor the Department of Justice had the authority to issue
Stamper a new notice of her right to sue the Board. Stamper's original
notice of her right to sue was not revoked when the Commission
reconsidered dismissal of her administrative charge. The regulation
contemplates the issuance of a new notice of the right to sue only when
the original notice was revoked, which means that the regulation does
not allow the Department of Justice to issue a new notice of the right
to sue when the original notice was not revoked.13
Reasoning that the original notice was not timely revoked, the panel
further stated:
The regulation codified an equitable rule followed by our predecessor
court that the Commission could restart the running of the limitations
period by issuing a second notice of the right to sue only if the

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1338-39.
1339.
1342.
1340 (emphasis in original).
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Commission issued a notice of intent to reconsider before the
expiration of the original [ninety-day] limitations period. 14
Because the Commission issued its notice of intent to reconsider two
years after it issued the first notice, it could not revive Stamper's right to
sue by doing so.T1
Next, the panel examined whether Stamper established, in the record
below, a causal relationship between her claimed medical condition and
the untimely filing of her civil complaint. Determining that Stamper
failed to present the district court with any meaningful evidence to
establish she was entitled to equitable tolling, the panel affirmed the
lower tribunal's finding to this effect as well.' 6

B. Shifting Evidentiary Burdens
Employment discrimination can be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence. In a circumstantial evidence case, the courts employ various
articulations of the burden-shifting framework established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." Under this
analytic device, the burdens of production and proof shift between the
parties at the pre-trial stage for summary judgment purposes. In an
unpublished decision, Voudy v. Sheriff of Broward County,1 8 an Eleventh
Circuit panel held that the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida applied the wrong articulation of the framework
established by the circuit court for a failure to promote case.
Consequently, the defendant employer failed to put forth sufficient
evidence of its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
employment action. 19 The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment
for the employer. 20
Voudy, a white Broward County deputy sheriff, had been passed over
for promotion to the position of sergeant in favor of two black deputies.
He sued, alleging reverse race discrimination occurred in the promotion
decisions. Following the completion of discovery, the sheriff moved for
summary judgment, contending that Voudy failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and that the sheriff articulated legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions at issue. The district court

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1342.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
701 F. App'x 865 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 866.
Id. at 871.
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agreed and granted the sheriffs motion for summary judgment. 21 The
appellate panel reversed, concluding that the district court applied the
wrong McDonnell Douglasformulation and that the sheriff failed to meet
his burden of articulating nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged
employment decision. 22
Acknowledging the continuing confusion in the circuit concerning the
evidentiary burden to be met by a failure-to-promote plaintiff, the panel
stated in Walker v. Mortham,23 decided in 1998, the correct McDonnell
Douglas variant to be applied by the trial courts in such cases:
While a number of our decisions employed the standard used by the
district court in this case-requiring plaintiffs to show, at the prima
facie case stage, that other equally or less qualified employees were
promoted over them-other cases required plaintiffs to show only that
the position was filled with a person outside the plaintiffs protected
class. We determined that both our prior precedent rule and an
independent assessment of which standard best comported with
Supreme Court precedent required only that a plaintiff show that the
position was filled by someone outside his protected class. At least at
the prima facie case stage, a plaintiff need not show that the candidate
who received the promotion was equally or less qualified than the
plaintiff.24

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court because
Voudy proved this. 25
Observing that since Voudy made a prima facie case under the Walker
articulation that the burden was shifted to the sheriff "to produce
evidence that its action was taken for a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason." 26 The evidence in the court below demonstrated that the sheriffs
delegated decision makers could not specifically recall why Voudy had
been passed over in favor of the black comparators. In support of
summary judgment, the sheriff offered evidence only of the criteria that
were generally considered when deciding promotions. 27 In the panel's
opinion, that was not enough to meet the employer's "exceedingly light"
burden. 28 "Without any evidence indicating how the identified criteria
21. Id. at 866-68.
22. Id. at 868-69.
23. 158 F.3d 1177, 1186 (11th Cir. 1998).
24. Voudy, 701 F. App'x at 869.
25. Id. at 871.
26. Id. at 869 (quoting Brooks v. County Comm'n of Jefferson Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162
(11th Cir. 2006)).
27. Id. at 870.
28. Id. at 869-70.
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were weighed or considered in Voudy's case, we can do no more than
speculate as to why [the black comparators] were promoted while Voudy
was not." 29 "The [employer] may not satisfy its burden by presenting a
hypothetical reason for the employment decision in question." 30
C. Standard of Review for Subpoena Decisions
The only Title VII decision issued by the Supreme Court during the
survey period resolved a minor split among the circuit courts of appeal
on the proper standard of appellate review of district court EEOC
subpoena enforcement decisions. 3 1 In McLane Co. v. EEOC,32 the EEOC
first sought "pedigree information" from McLane from its evaluation of
its employees' physical fitness for duty that it required its employees to
undergo upon returning to work from medical leaves of absence. 33 A
female McLane employee failed the examination when she attempted to
return to work following a maternity leave and was terminated from
employment as a result. The employee then filed a sex discrimination
charge, which the EEOC investigated. For its investigation, the EEOC
first sought from McLane the names, Social Security numbers,
addresses, and telephone numbers of each of its employees asked to take
the evaluation. McLane declined to provide the information sought. In an
apparent response, the EEOC then expanded its request to include the
data on all of McLane's operations nationwide and substantively
broadened the request (and its investigation) to include possible age
discrimination. McLane refused to provide this information as well. In a
further response, the EEOC then brought two subpoena enforcement
actions against McLane in the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona; one based upon the former female employee's sex

29. Id. at 870.
30. Id. at 869 (quoting Walker, 158 F.3d at 1184).
31. The split is characterized as "minor" because when presented with this standard of
review question only the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the
position the Supreme Court reversed on appeal. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kronos, Inc., 620 F.3d
287 (3d Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 261 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., Inc., 448 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2006); EEOC v.
Dillon Companies, Inc., 310 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 771 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
32. 137 S. Ct. 1159 (2017).
33. Id. at 1164. Pedigree information is contact information for possible witnesses in
an investigation. It typically consists of names, addresses, telephone numbers, electronic
mail addresses, and other similar information.
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discrimination charge, and the second based upon the EEOC's own age
discrimination charge. 34
The district court declined to enforce the portions of the subpoenas
seeking the pedigree information in both enforcement actions because it
concluded that the information was not relevant to the charges. The
EEOC then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the district court. The Ninth Circuit panel
reviewed the district court's decision de novo, based upon circuit
precedent, even though the panel questioned why that standard of review
applied since all other circuits concluded that the EEOC was due
deferential review. 35 As a result of the de novo review, the Ninth Circuit
panel concluded the district court wrongly decided the enforcement
actions. 36
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision,
concluding that the Ninth Circuit precedent was wrong.3 7 Writing for the
Court, 38 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the history of Title VII and
"basic principles of institutional capacity counsel in favor of deferential
review." 39
D. Coverage Under the Act
1.
Sexual Orientation
Probably the most widely publicized decision issued by the Eleventh
Circuit during the survey period was Evans v. Georgia Regional
Hospital.40 In a two-to-one decision, a panel affirmed the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia's dismissal of an
employee's Title VII claim alleging her employer subjected her to
discrimination because of her sexual orientation. Relying on binding

34. Id. at 1164-66.
35. Id. at 1166. See infra note 38.
36. McLane, 187 S. Ct. at 1166.
37. Id. at 1170.
38. All of the then-sitting Justices, except Ginsburg, joined in the decision. Justice Neil
Gorsuch's appointment to the bench was not confirmed, so he did not participate in the
decision. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the announcement of the abuse of discretion
standard, but would have nevertheless affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision in this
particular case because she agreed with the circuit court's conclusion that the district court
denied the subpoena based upon a legal error. The district court required the EEOC to
"show more than relevance in order to gain enforcement of its subpoena." Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 1167-68.
40. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
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circuit precedent, 41 a majority of the panel reaffirmed the long-standing
circuit view that sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited by
Title VII. On December 11, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Evans's
petition for writ of certiorari. 42
The Eleventh Circuit ruling in Evans conflicts with the new view of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which during
4
the survey period, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 3
reversed its prior precedent and held that sexual orientation bias is a
44
The Seventh
form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII.

Circuit is the only federal appeals court thus far to rule that Title VII
45
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit is possibly also reevaluating its prior
precedent in this regard. During the survey period, that court granted en
banc review of its earlier panel decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express,
47
Inc., 46 queuing up the same issue for full court review. The Second
Circuit specifically instructed the parties to brief whether Title VII
prohibits "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation through its
48
prohibition of discrimination 'because of .. . sex."
Employers with multi-state operations are now faced with the new
ambiguity in federal employment discrimination law created by Hively.
The issue probably will not be settled by the Supreme Court before its
next term.

41. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). In Bonner v. City of
Prichard,661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) the Eleventh Circuit adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close
of business on September 30, 1981.
42. Evans v. Ga. Reg'1 Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
43. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
44. Id. at 351-52.
45. All other circuit courts considering the question have determined that sexual
orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title VII. See Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Simmonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d
Cir. 2000); Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogatedon other grounds by
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 78 (1998); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th
Cir. 1989); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005).
46. 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017). On February 26, 2018, the Second Circuit decided
Zarda, aligning with the Seventh Circuit and broadening the split among the circuits.
47. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
13127 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017).
48. Id. at *6.
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2.
Immutable Characteristics
EEOC v. CatastropheManagement Solutions 49 was first reported on in
last year's survey article.50 The issue invoking the government's ire in
that case was the employer's decision to rescind a job offer after the
applicant refused to cut her dreadlocks before starting work as a
customer service representative.5 1 The EEOC sued on the applicant's
behalf asserting that dreadlocks are a "natural outgrowth" of black hair
texture and an immutable trait that is a "substantial determiner of
race." 52 The United States District Court for the Southern District of

Alabama disagreed, concluding that the hairstyle is a "mutable
characteristic," not an unchangeable characteristic.5 3 The EEOC
appealed. The Eleventh Circuit rejected each of the arguments asserted
by the EEOC on appeal. The panel concluded that a hairstyle is a choice,
not a characteristic. The panel reasoned that while discrimination on the
basis of black hair texture is prohibited by Title VII, reasonable grooming
standards are not. 54

During this survey period, the full court considered the petition for
hearing en banc.55 While most of the judges in active service voted
against granting the rehearing en banc requested by the EEOC, the
issues presented by the case divided the court. Three judges dissented
from the denial of rehearing en banc.56 Joined by Judges Rosenbaum and
Jill Pryor, Judge Martin filed an eloquent dissent explaining why
attempting to neatly categorize racial traits as mutable and immutable
5
is "no longer good law."

7

E. Employer Defenses
1.
Judicial Estoppel
The other significant Title VII decision announced by the Eleventh
Circuit during the survey period concerned the proper application of the

49. 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016).
50. See Corbin & Duvall, Employment Discrimination,supra note 1, at 981 n.34-43
and accompanying text, discussing the earlier decision reported at 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.
2016).
51. Catastrophe,837 F.3d at 1159.
52. Id. at 1160-62.
53. Id. at 1169-70.
54. Id. at 1167-68.
55. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017).
56. Id. at 1278 (Martin, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1280.
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doctrine of judicial estoppel to employment cases. 5 8 The Author's now
retired law partner and co-author of this survey Article for many years,
Peter Reed Corbin, foresaw the impending doctrinal shift in last year's
survey Article, when he reported on the earlier proceedings in Slater v.
U.S. Steel Corp.59 Peter correctly anticipated that the court of appeals
was setting up to overturn long-standing circuit precedent and that it
would probably occur during this survey period.
In September, when the court finally handed down its final en banc
decision in Slater, it announced a new view of the doctrine. 0 The court
ruled that a trial court may not dismiss an employee's discrimination suit
simply because she fails to disclose the claim in her bankruptcy petition
without first analyzing whether she intentionally meant to mislead the
court with the omission.6 1 To do otherwise would cause a windfall for
defendant employers who escaped potential liability for the debtor's
discrimination claim under the prior harsh rule. 62
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that two of its prior precedents that
looked solely to whether the debtor omitted a claim from her bankruptcy
filing to determine if the debtor intended to deceive, were flawed and
inconsistent with other circuit precedent. 63 Trial courts in the Eleventh
Circuit must now examine the totality of the circumstances to divine the
debtor's intent when faced with an equitable estoppel defense. 64

58. The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel is "intended to prevent the perversion of
the judicial process" and "[protect] the essential integrity of the judicial process" "by
prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the
moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). On Petition for Rehearing at 12-13, Slater v. United States Steel
Corp., 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 12-15548).
59. See Corbin & Duvall, Employment Discrimination, supra note 1, at 981 n.91-101
and accompanying text; 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016).
60. 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017).
61. Id. at 1176-77.
62. Id. at 1187.
63. Id. at 1181-85.
64. Id. at 1189.
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II. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

A. Coverage under the Act
The Author first reported on Villarrealv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 65
in our 2017 survey article.6 6 The Author discussed the conclusion reached
by the court of appeals that job applicants cannot maintain disparate
impact claims under the ADEA. 67 That decision was affirmed earlier this
year when the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision.68
The remaining vestige of Villarreal's unsuccessful attempt to
prosecute an age discrimination claim against his former employer was
decided during this survey period.69 Besides the matters considered in
the previous appeal, Villarreal also argued in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia that his alternate attempted
disparate treatment claim was timely under the continuing-violation
doctrine. 70 On remand, the district court concluded otherwise, and a
circuit panel affirmed.7 1
III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The only reported ADA case decided in 2017 concerned review of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia's grant
of summary judgment for an employer. 72 In a somewhat lengthy opinion,
the district court's judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.7 3
The part reversed concerned several aspects of various rulings below.
The most factually interesting aspect concerned Taser training for police
officers. Lewis, a police detective, suffered a heart attack of unknown
etiology in 2008. She recovered and was able to return to work with no
restrictions. A few years later, however, her employing police department
adopted new training requirements, including one requiring that all
police officers receive a five second Taser shock as part of their training
on the use of the non-lethal device. Lewis was concerned that her prior

65. 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
66. See Corbin & Duvall, Employment Discrimination,supra note 1, at 981 n.118-29
and accompanying text, commenting on the en banc decision reported at 839 F.3d 958 (11th
Cir. 2016).
67. See Corbin & Duvall, Employment Discrimination,supra note 1 at n.119.
68. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017).
69. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 702 F. App'x 797 (11th Cir. 2017).
70. Id. at 798.
71. Id. at 799.
72. Lewis v. City of Union City, 877 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2017).
73. Id. at 1021.
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heart attack might place her at a greater risk of injury from the shock
than the average police officer. 74 She consulted with her primary care
physician who shared her concern and wrote a letter to the City's chief of
police in response, stating the concerns and indicating that Lewis was
being treated for "several chronic conditions including a heart
condition." 75 Upon receipt of the doctor's letter, the chief caused Lewis to
be placed on an unpaid leave of absence until she could return to work
with no physician-imposed restrictions.76 Eventually, after Lewis could
not produce a medical clearance, she was terminated from employment.77
The district court concluded that the plaintiff adduced insufficient
evidence to support her pretext claim on the reason for her termination
and granted her former employer's motion for summary judgment. 78 The
appellate panel disagreed, finding the placement of Lewis on unpaid
leave and her subsequent termination for being absent without leave
sufficiently created a jury question on the defendant's motivation.7 9
The second interesting aspect of the appeal concerned whether Lewis
created an issue of fact on whether she was disabled or "regarded as"
disabled by her employer when she was discharged from employment.80
The appellate panel affirmed the lower court's finding that Lewis did not
produce sufficient evidence to establish that she was actually disabled,
but reversed on her alternate theory because it held Lewis proved her
former employer regarded her as such.81 The court's discussion of the
differing proof standards for establishing a disability and for establishing
an employer's perception of disability are instructive and furthers
Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence in both respects. The opinion expands the
discussion started by the court of appeals in 2014 in Mazzeo v. Color
Resolutions International,LLC,82 and is worthy of a read if a practitioner
is confronted with a need to consider the distinctions between the two
possible bases for employer liability.
The third interesting aspect of the appeal concerned whether receiving
a Taser shock is properly considered an essential function of a police
detective's job.85 The panel held that the district court erred in concluding

74. Id. at 1004-05.
75. Id. at 1005.

76. Id. at 1007.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1009.

79. Id. at 1019.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1009-14.
Id. at 1012.
746 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014).
877 F.3d at 1012.

2018]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1129

that Lewis did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that she was
a qualified individual. 84 In the earlier proceedings below, a magistrate
judge recommended that the district court grant the police department's
motion for summary judgment in part because Lewis failed to
86
demonstrate that she was qualified to be a police detective. The district
court adopted the magistrate's recommendation. 86 Based upon its review
of the record, however, the appellate panel concluded there was
"significant evidence"87 that the ability to withstand Taser shocks was
88
not an essential job function of a police detective. Observing that since
the City's job description for the position mentioned no Taser shock
requirement in either the physical demands or work environment
sections of the job description, "a jury would be justified in concluding
that receiving a Taser shock was not an essential function of Ms. Lewis's
89
job, in which case it would follow that she was a 'qualified individual."'
Finally, the panel also discussed the City's possible direct threat
defense to Lewis's claim.90 The panel rejected the district court's adoption
of the magistrate judge's report and recommendations in this regard
because, again, the essential functions of a police detective were not
sufficiently established in the record below: "As we have held that there
is a genuine dispute of material fact on what the essential functions of
a .

.

. detective are, we certainly cannot resolve the question of whether

91
she can perform those as-yet-undefined essential functions safely."

IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS

OF

1866 AND 1871

A. Section 1983
First Amendment
1.
In Rodriguez v. City of Doral,92 the Eleventh Circuit vacated a United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruling against

84. Id. at 1013.
85. Id. at 1009.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1013.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1014. The magistrate judge stated that the direct threat defense would be
available to the City if Lewis was able to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination. Id. The magistrate judge reasoned that the letter from Lewis' doctor
indicated that she could not be exposed to a possible Taser shot because it "posed a
significant risk of harm to her health." Id.
91. Id.
92. 863 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2017).
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a former police officer in a First Amendment associational discrimination
case. 93 Rodriguez, a former police officer, alleged in that he had been
terminated for supporting the mayor's political rival in an election
campaign. 94 The plaintiff had been forced to either immediately resign
his position or be fired.9 5 The district court concluded that, because the
plaintiff had resigned, he had suffered no adverse employment action.96
On appeal, the panel concluded that the plaintiff had been "effectively
terminated"9 7 under those facts and vacated the lower court's ruling.98
The decision in Rodriguez, might be best known for its references to
the Game of Thrones television series.99 More interesting to this Author,
however, is the sordid backdrop of political intrigue that apparently
permeated the City of Doral during the time of Rodriguez's
employment.100
B. Immunity; Qualified and Absolute
Prosecutors operate within the ambit of two types of immunity,
absolute and qualified.101 In Mikko v. City of Atlanta,102 the panel was
presented with a prosecutor's assertion that he was absolutely immune
from suit for causing a city employee to be fired. The panel disagreed. 103
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
denied the Fulton County, Georgia prosecutor's motion for dismissal on
both qualified and absolute immunity grounds. 104 The appellate panel
reversed and remanded the district court's ruling on qualified immunity
but affirmed on the denial of absolute immunity.105 "Absolute
prosecutorial immunity is function related." 0 6 To be entitled to absolute
immunity, a "prosecutor must show it is 'justified for the function in
07
question.'"1
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Mikko sued the City and the Fulton County prosecutor and his
assistant in their individual capacities over being fired from his job as
director of the Atlanta Police Department crime lab.108 Mikko claimed
that when he was first hired by the City he negotiated the right to
continue consulting in cases outside of Atlanta.109 He further asserted
that when a Florida prosecutor learned Mikko was to testify for the
defense in a Florida case, the Florida prosecutor complained about
Mikko's planned testimony to the assistant Fulton County district
attorney, who shared the complaint with her boss, the Fulton County
district attorney, who complained to Mikko's boss, who then fired him. 110
"The [defendant] prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for
their alleged actions in this case because those actions were not taken in
their role as advocates."111
The case in which Mikko planned to testify was not a case that these
prosecutors were prosecuting or planning to prosecute, nor was it even
located within their jurisdiction. As a result, their attempt to "control"
or prevent Mikko's testimony-testimony of a witness who was neither
their witness nor a witness against the State of Georgia-does not fall
within their duties as advocates. 112
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court on the
possible availability of qualified immunity to the prosecutors: "Qualified
immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in
their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." 118 The panel left that determination for the
trial court on remand. 114
The other immunity decision reported during the survey period also
concerned a claim of associational discrimination. In Gaines v.
Wardynski,115 the panel held that a school district superintendent was
entitled to qualified immunity in a case alleging that a teacher was
denied a promotion because of her father's negative speech about school
officials.116 Upon determining that when the case arose in 2013 it was not
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clearly established that taking an adverse action against a public
employee because of a family member's speech violated the First
Amendment, the panel reversed the denial of the superintendent's
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and
instructed the trial court on remand to grant the superintendent's
motion.117

117. Id.

